Elusive Knowledge-David Lewis英文资料.pdf

Elusive Knowledge DAVID LEWIS David Lewis (1941-2001) was Class of 1943 University Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University. His contributions spanned philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. In On the Plurality of Worlds, he defended his challenging metaphysical position, modal realism. He was also the author of the books Convention, Counterfactuals, Parts of Classes, and several volumes of collected papers. Reprinted from Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74. (1996), by permission of the Australasian Journal of Philosophy ___________________________________________________ We know a lot. I know what food penguins eat. I know that phones used to ring, but nowadays squeal, when someone ca11s up. I know that Essendon won the 1993 Grand Fina1. I know that here is a hand, and here is another. We have a11 sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have it in abundance. To doubt that would be absurd. At any rate, to doubt it in any serious and lasting way would be absurd; and even philosophical and temporary doubt, under the influence of argument, is more than a little peculiar. It is a Moorean fact that we know a lot. It is one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary. Besides knowing a lot that is everyday and trite, I myself think that we know a lot that is interesting and esoteric and controversia1. We know a lot about things unseen: tiny particles and pervasive fields, not to mention one anothers underwear. Sometimes we even know what an author meant by his writings. But on these questions, let us agree to disagree peacefu11y with the champions of post-knowledgeism. The most trite and ordinary parts of our knowledge wi11 be problem enough. For no sooner do we engage in epistemology--the systematic philosophical examination of knowledge--than we meet a compelling argument that we know next to