企业经营者激励约束机制的理论探讨与模型构建（Theoretical discussion and model construction of incentive and restraint mechanism for enterprise managers）.doc

企业经营者激励约束机制的理论探讨与模型构建（Theoretical discussion and model construction of incentive and restraint mechanism for enterprise managers） The second constraint is called the incentive compatibility constraint (IC:Intentive Compatibility), that if a is the principal hope action, a in A are any mobile agents can be selected, then only the people from the choice of expected utility gained a greater than that obtained from the selection of the expected utility, the agent will choose a. Principal-agent theory greatly improved the people on the relationship between capital owners, managers and workers and understand the market more generally, but its mathematical model because of its abstraction only economic significance, and can not be used for the design of incentive mechanism of specific operators. Therefore, when applying the western incentive theory and drawing on the successful experience of western enterprises, we should start with the actual situation of our country and build a comprehensive incentive mechanism and a restraint mechanism for the managers of enterprises in china. 2, to build incentive mechanism and restraint mechanism for enterprise managers in China 2.1 managers incentive mechanism 2.1.1 incentive scheme model Constructing incentive mechanism requires identifying the objective function of the operator and satisfying the objective function through the corresponding mechanism, so that the operator can work hard and realize the clients objective function. The objective function of managers is to maximize the utility of individuals, on the one hand, from personal income, on the other hand, from self fulfilling sense of achievement and social prestige. The incentive mechanism must be arranged by corresponding variables to satisfy the objective function that managers realize the maximization of personal utility, and motivate them to achieve the goal of the client. The incentive scheme model as shown in figure 1. 2.1.2 current incentive problems in China In the