Advertisement Allocation for Generalized …广告为广义分配u2026.pdfVIP

Advertisement Allocation for Generalized Second Pricing Schemes Ashish Goel Mohammad Mahdian† Hamid Nazerzadeh‡ Amin Saberi Abstract Recently, there has been a surge of interest in algorithms that allocate advertisement space in an online revenue-competitive manner. Most such algorithms, however, assume a pay-as-you-bid pricing scheme. In this paper, we study the query allocation problem where the ad space is priced using the well-known and widely-used generalized second price (GSP) scheme. We observe that the previous algorithms fail to achieve a bounded competitive ratio under the GSP scheme. On the positive side, we present online constant-competitive algorithms for the problem. 1 Introduction In the last few years, there has been a lot of interest in online auctions especially in the context of sponsored search. This is not surprising considering that search engines hold thousands of individual auctions every second for the allocation of advertisement next to their search results. The process of choosing and charging the advertisers is a daunting algorithmic and engineering task. The search engines typically take into consideration several factors including the search keyword, the demographics of the user, the frequency of the keyword, as well as the bid, budget and click-through rate of the advertisers for each of these decisions. Modeling and analyzing these auctions have been a challenge as well: the repeated nature of the auctions as well as budget constraints make the structure of the equilibria rich and complicated. Moreover, miscon- ceptions of the first designers of these mechanisms about the Vickrey auction have lead to decisions that add to this diculty. Nevertheless, comp