Secure Identity Based Encryption without Random Oracles：（安全的基于身份的加密没有随机的神谕）.pdfVIP

An extended abstract of this paper is to appear in Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2004, Springer-Verlag. Secure Identity Based Encryption Without Random Oracles Dan Boneh∗ Xavier Boyen† dabo@ xb@ Abstract We present a fully secure identity based encryption scheme whose proof of security does not rely on the random oracle heuristic. Security is based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Previous constructions of this type incured a large penatly factor in the security reduction from the underlying complexity assumption. The security reduction of the present system is polynomial in all the parameters. 1 Introduction Identity Based Encryption (IBE) provides a public key encryption mechanism where a public key is an arbitrary string such as an email address or a telephone number. The corresponding private key can only be generated by a Private Key Generator (PKG) who has knowledge of a master secret. In an IBE system, users authenticate themselves to the PKG and obtain private keys corresponding to their identities. Although the identity based encryption model was proposed two decades ago [Sha84], and a few early precursors suggested over the years [Tan87, TI89, MY96], it is only recently that the first working implementations were proposed. Boneh and Franklin [BF01, BF03] defined a security model for identity based encryption and gave a construction based on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem. Cocks [Coc01] describes another construction using quadratic residues modulo a composite. The security of these systems requires cryptographic hash functions that are modeled as random oracles, i.e., these systems are only