Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities：（序贯拍卖与互补性资源的分配）.pdfVIP

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Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities：（序贯拍卖与互补性资源的分配）.pdf

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Sequential Auctions fo r the Allocatio n of Resources wit h Complementarities Craig Boutilie r Moises Goldszmidt and Bikas h Sabata Dept. of Computer Science SRI International University of British Columbia 333 Kavenswood Ave . Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4 Menlo Park, CA 94025 cebly@cs.ube.ca {moises,sabata}@ Abstrac t obtained fo r transporting materia l i n a n optima l fashion , he- licopters and pilot s lose any value they may have had . Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied Tw o methods fo r dealing wit h complementaritie s have as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and inultiagcnl decision problems . When agents value re- been studied : simultaneous auctions fo r multipl e goods [ 1 , sources in combination rather than in isolation , one gener- 17|; and combinatorial auctions i n whic h agents submit bids ally relies on combinatorial auctions where agents bid tor re- fo r resource bundles [16 , 18, 19, 9 , 21) . Specific models source bundles . or simultaneous auctions for all resources. We sometimes deal (possibly implicitly ) wit h substitutio n ef- develop a different model , where agents bid for required