c h a p t e r 5 behaviorism at fifty - whitman …（c h p t e r 5行为主义在50 -惠特曼u2026）.pdf

c H A p T E R 5 Behaviorism at Fifty EDITORS NOTE This article was first published in Science (1963, 140(3570),951-958) and later in Behaviorism and Phenomenology: Contrasting Basesfor Modern Psychology, edited by T.W. Wann (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. 79-97). An abbreviated version appears as Chapter 8 in Skinners Contingencies ofReinforcement (1969, pp. 221-242). The latter also includes extensive addenda (pp. 242-268) in the form of 11 titled Notes on topics such as private stimuli, awareness, and feelings. The title commemorates Watsons seminal paper on behaviorism, Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It, published in 1913. Skinner contrasts behaviorism with traditional mentalistic views of humankind. Traits and states of mind, argues Skinner, offer no real explanation of human behavior and stand in the way of a more effective analysis. Though the traditional point of view still receives strong support, an effective science of behavior has now emerged, thanks to the efforts of Darwin, Lloyd Morgan, E.L Thorndike, John B. Watson, and others. Even Freud contributed to the behavioristic argument by showing that mental activity did not, at least, require consciousness. Some forms of behaviorism, Skinner notes, dealt with the problem of mind by Simply ruling it out of the realm of scientific study. His own version, radical bebauiorism, does not. Private events, argues Skinner, can be considered pan of behavior itself and can be interpreted in terms of what we know about public events in behavior. Certain contingencies of reinforcement allow us to respond discriminatively with respect to the world around us; they also allow us to respond discriminatively with respect to events inside of us, though the discriminations are necessarily less precise. Conscious content