总经理薪酬非财务绩效衡量指标与公司未来绩效-会计评论-国立.PDF

The International Journal of Account ing Studies 論 37 2003 年7 85-116 理量 來 柳 ∗ 立 度 來理勵 理勵 參 Hayes and Schaefer (2000)理 理異 來 來 來 理 來 精 來 行 了理 更 行 理 異 來 行 來理 理理論 量理 ∗論兩匿 Professor Scott Schaefer 福 2001 年論 見 NSC 89 -2416 -H -018 -0 11 理 不 來 200 1 年 12 2003 年 1 85 86 論 37 2003 年7 CEO Compensation, Nonfinancial Performance Measures and Future Performance Liu-Ching Tsai National Chiayi University Abstract Performance evaluation and reward systems are two important instruments used by the boards of directors to reduce agency problems. Since many recent accounting studies have criticized that accounting-based measures do not adequately reflect all the economic consequences of current actions and decisions, it is worthy to investigate whether boards of directors adopt nonfinancial measures to supplement accounting-based measures. Subject to the unobservability of compensation schemes, following Hayes and Schaefer’s reasoning, I argue if boards of directors adopt nonfinancial measures, the phenomena that CEO compensation is informative about future corporate performance should be observed. This paper shows that the relationship between compensation and future performance is significantly positive