A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in （技术缺陷的详细描述）.pdf

A Technically Detailed Description of Flaws in the SM-3 and GMD Missile Defense Systems Revealed by the Defense Department’s Ballistic Missile Test Data By George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol Prologue This White Paper contains an elaboration of the discussion from the article, A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan, which was published in May 2010 in Arms Control Today. It is intended for non-specialists who wish to have a more detailed understanding of the fundamental problems associated with the SM-3 and GMD systems discussed in the Arms Control Today article. Summary of the issues Discussed in this White Paper Both the GMD and SM-3 systems are highly susceptible to massive confusion that leads to complete performance breakdowns when they encounter objects that have characteristics that are unexpected. These unexpected characteristics could include warheads that look different from what is expected, and/or objects that look somewhat like warheads. Even when it was known that false signals could be created by fragments from a chuffing rocket motor, the failure to prepare for it led to the catastrophic failure of the FTG-06 scene recognition program. This unintentional countermeasure that caused the failure of the FTG-06 can be easily replicated in combat by intelligent and resourceful adversaries, and requires technology that is far less complex than the technology needed to build and operate ballistic missiles. Infrared and radar data from MIT Lincoln Laboratory, a Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), shows that it will not be difficult for adversaries to create objects that will confront the scene matching process with targets that can easily be mistaken for warheads. The same MIT Lincoln Laboratory data shows that the SM-3 Block IA kill vehicle, which cannot measure the temperature of objects it observes, will be en