互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取 - 控制与决策.pdf

第25 卷 第6 期 控 制 与 决 策 2010 年 6 月 Vol. 25 No. 6 Control and Decision Jun. 2010 文章编号: 1001-0920 (2010) 06-0808-06 互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取 杜义飞, 李仕明 ( 电子科技大学经济与管理学院，成都610054) 摘 要: 通过建立Biform 两阶段博弈模型, 分析互补性资产分布与创新者价值获取之间的关系; 通过以创新者的最 小剩余代替其价值分配下界, 以边际价值增加代替其价值分配上界的区间偏好条件, 确定创新者在第1 阶段的战略 选择偏好; 给定创新产品的数量, 创新者价值获取大小受互补性资产总量、创新竞争差值、独立互补性资产方数量和 总的创新竞争剩余的影响; 进而, 利用创新者偏向与所有可获取的独立互补性资产集合建立创新价值创造联盟. 关键词: 创新者价值获取；互补性资产；分布；Biform博弈 中图分类号: F276.4 ；F224.32 文献标识码: A Distribution of complementary assets and value appropriation of innovators DU Yi-fei , LI Shi-ming (School of Management and Economics，University of Electronic Science and Technology of China ，Chengdu 610054，China. Correspondent ：DU Yi-fei ，E-mail ：duyf@uestc.edu.cn) Abstract: The relationship between the distribution of complementary assets and the value appropriation of innovator is analyzed by establishment of two-stage Biform game model. The interval preference condition, whose lower bound of value appropriation is replaced by the minimum residual of innovation and the upper bound is replaced by marginal value added, determines the choice of preference for innovator in the first phase of the model. The quantity of innovation product is given, and the value appropriation of the innovator is affected by the total size of the complementary assets, innovation competitive difference, the number of independent complementary agencies and the total competitive residual of innovation. Furthermore, innovators always look forward to working with the collection of all available independent complementary assets to establish the coalition. Key words: Value appropriatio