担保机制,信用评级与中小企业私募债融资成本.PDF

债券市场 担保机制、信用评级与中小企业私募债融资成本 李明明 秦凤鸣 (山东大学经济学院，山东 济南 250100) 摘要：本文主要考察担保机制和信用评级如何影响中小企业私募债的融资成本。实证结果发现，信用评级能够降低私募 债的融资成本，并且对于民营中小企业发行的私募债和没有披露财务信息的私募债而言，信用评级对降低融资成本的效 应更大。从担保机制上看，具有担保的私募债融资成本更高，说明有担保的私募债发行人信用风险更高，这与道德风险 模型一致。对于具有担保的私募债而言，由担保机构进行担保的私募债融资成本低于由普通企业及其他进行担保的融 资成本。本文说明，信用评级有利于缓解私募债发行的逆向选择问题，而担保机制有利于解决私募债市场的道德风险问 题。本文的结论对于完善中小企业私募债运行机制和缓解中小企业融资困境有一定的启示。 关键词：担保；信用评级；中小企业私募债；融资成本 Abstract: This paper mainly explores how collateral and credit rating affect financing cost of small and medium-sized private bonds. The empirical results indicate that credit ratings could reduce financing cost of private bonds. For private bonds issued by non-state-owned firms and firms disclosing no financial information, the effect of credit ratings on financing cost is larger. From the perspective of collateral, private bonds with collateral have higher financing cost, which indicates that private bonds issuers with collateral have higher credit risks. This conclusion is consistent with moral hazard model. For private bonds with collateral, financing cost of bonds guaranteed by guarantee companies is lower than that that of bonds guaranteed by other parties. This paper indicates that credit ratings mainly reduce the adverse selection while collateral mainly reduces moral hazard. The conclusion of this paper has some implications for perfecting operating mechanism of small and medium-sized private bonds and solving financing difficulties of small and medium-sized firms. Key words: collateral, credit rating, small and medium-sized private bonds, financing cost 作者简介：李明明，女，山东大学经济学院金融系博士生，研究方向：债券市场、信用评级。秦凤鸣，女，山东大学经济 学院金融系教授、博士生导师，研究方向：债券市场、信用评级。 中图分类号：F830.9 文献标识码：A 私募债。中小企业私募债也被称为“中国版垃圾债”， 引言 是一种高