(财政学罗森第九版英文课件)Chap006Political Economy.ppt

* * axes and labels 1st click – Brad 2nd click – Jen 3rd click – Angelina 4th click – “Single-peaked preferences” and two arrows 5th click – “Double-peaked preferences” and curved arrow * * * * Melanie votes for library if Rhett votes for hospital; and Rhett and Scarlet trade votes for the pool and library * Left box by 2nd level paragraphs Right box by 2nd level paragraphs * Distribution and labels 1st click - Female politician locates on right 2nd click - Male politician locates directly to left of female 3rd click - female moves to left of male (but still to right of mean) 4th click - male politician moves just left of mean * * * * Axes and labels 1st click – V schedule 2nd click – C schedule 3rd click – two tangents, dashed line, Q* and “Efficient Output” tag 4th click – dashed line, Qbc, “Actual output” * * Axes, labels, D, MR, and S=MC 1st click - rents * * * * * * 6-* 6-* ? 2010 The McGraw-Hill Companies, All Rights Reserved McGraw-Hill/Irwin McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright ? 2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. CHAPTER 6 Political Economy Copyright ? 2010 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. McGraw-Hill/Irwin Direct Democracy-Unanimity Rules r per year 0 0’ Adam’s share (SA) Eve’s share (SE) DrA The Lindahl Model DrE r* S* Feasibility of Unanimity Rules Reaching equilibrium Practical problems Strategic behavior Time to reach equilibrium Direct Democracy-Majority Voting Rules Majority voting rule – one more than half of the voters must favor a measure for it to be approved Voter Choice Brad Jen Angelina First A C B Second B B C Third C A A Direct Democracy-Majority Voting Rules Voting Paradox – community preferences can be inconsistent even though individual’s preferences are consistent Agenda Manipulation – process of organizing order of votes to ensure a favorable outcome Cycling – when paired voting on more than two possibilities goes on indefinitely without a conclusion ever being reached