dopamine, affordance and active inference多巴胺,给养和活跃的推理.pdfVIP

Dopamine, Affordance and Active Inference 1 1 1 2 1 1 Karl J. Friston *, Tamara Shiner , Thomas FitzGerald , Joseph M. Galea , Rick Adams , Harriet Brown , 1 1 1 2 Raymond J. Dolan , Rosalyn Moran , Klaas Enno Stephan , Sven Bestmann 1The Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, University College London, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom, 2 Sobell Department of Motor Neuroscience and Movement Disorders, University College London Institute of Neurology, Queen Square, London, United Kingdom Abstract The role of dopamine in behaviour and decision-making is often cast in terms of reinforcement learning and optimal decision theory. Here, we present an alternative view that frames the physiology of dopamine in terms of Bayes-optimal behaviour. In this account, dopamine controls the precision or salience of (external or internal) cues that engender action. In other words, dopamine balances bottom-up sensory information and top-down prior beliefs when making hierarchical inferences (predictions) about cues that have affordance. In this paper, we focus on the consequences of changing tonic levels of dopamine firing using simulations of cued sequential movements. Crucially, the predictions driving movements are based upon a hierarchical generative model that infers the context in which movements are made. This means that we can confuse agents by changing the context (order) in which cues are presented. These simulations provide a (Bayes-optimal) model of contextual uncertainty and set switching that can be quantified in terms of behavioural and electrophysiological responses. Furthermore, one can sim