group decisions in biodiversity conservation implications from game theory从博弈论集团决定在生物多样性保护的影响.pdfVIP

Group Decisions in Biodiversity Conservation: Implications from Game Theory 1 2 David M. Frank , Sahotra Sarkar * 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, United States of America, 2 Section of Integrative Biology and Department of Philosophy, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, United States of America Abstract Background: Decision analysis and game theory [1,2] have proved useful tools in various biodiversity conservation planning and modeling contexts [3–5]. This paper shows how game theory may be used to inform group decisions in biodiversity conservation scenarios by modeling conflicts between stakeholders to identify Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria. These are cases in which each agent pursuing individual self–interest leads to a worse outcome for all, relative to other feasible outcomes. Three case studies from biodiversity conservation contexts showing this feature are modeled to demonstrate how game–theoretical representation can inform group decision-making. Methodology and Principal Findings: The mathematical theory of games is used to model three biodiversity conservation scenarios with Pareto–inefficient Nash equilibria: (i) a two–agent case involving wild dogs in South Africa; (ii) a three–agent raptor and grouse conservation scenario from the United Kingdom; and (iii) an n–agent fish and coral conservation scenario from the Philippines. In each case there is reason to believe that traditional mechanism–design solutions that appeal to material incentives may be inadequate, and the game–theoretical analysis recommends a resumption of further deliberation between agents and the initiation of trust—and confidence—building measures. Conclusions and Significance: Game theory can and should be used as a normativ