存在强势零售商及直销渠道的供应链内生时机_刘军_谭德庆.pdfVIP

网络出版时间：2012-11-28 15:05 网络出版地址：/kcms/detail/51.1196.TP1505.036.html 存在强势零售商与直销渠道的供应链内生时机* 刘 军，谭德庆 （西南交通大学经济管理学院，成都 610031） 摘 要：在由强弱零售商和直销渠道组成的非对称供应链中，首先探讨定价权转移、消费者忠诚度以及保留价格差异对三种 博弈时机下均衡结果的影响，然后研究供应链内生时机，接着对消费者剩余和社会福利进行分析，最后通过数值仿真验证所 得结论。研究表明：在三种博弈时机下，定价权转移使得强势零售商比竞争对手获得更多利润；供应链博弈内生时机为制造 商领导和零售商领导；随着产品保留价格差异的增加，消费者剩余降低，但社会福利先降低后升高。 关键词：供应链；分销渠道；强势零售商；直销渠道；内生时机；福利分析 中图分类号：TP391.9 ；F224.32 文献标识码：A Endogenous timing of supply chain with dominant retailer and direct channel LIU Jun ，TAN De-qing (School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China) Abstract: In an asymmetrical supply chain with dominant/weak retailer and direct channel, the article firstly discussed the effect of transfer of pricing power, consumer loyalty and reservation price difference on equilibrium results under three game timing. Then, it studied endogenous timing of supply chain, and analyzed consumer surplus and social welfare. Finally, it verified the conclusions through numerical simulation. The study shows that transfer of pricing power enables dominant retailer get more profits than its competitor. Game endogenous timing of supply chain is manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg. When reservation price difference increases, consumer surplus will increase. However, social welfare firstly decreases and then increases. Key words : supply chain; distribution channel; dominant retailer; direct channel; endogenous timing; welfare analysis 0 引言 中，Geylani[6]等发现制造商能够通过帮助弱势零售商促销产 品获得更多利润；Dukes[7]发现弱势零售