高管薪酬结构与盈余管理.docxVIP

基于企业业绩的薪酬决定因素与盈余管理蔡老师的研究设计要求如下：包括研究主题、目的、背景、内容、方法，可以不包括结论，具体格式可以参照期刊论文，原定7月5日上交第一章引言第二章文献综述与研究假设2.1高管薪酬结构决定因素2.2高管薪酬结构与盈余管理2.3绩效薪酬与企业业绩第三章研究设计第四章实证研究第五章结论薪酬结构：财务噪音，企业未来的发展机会（executive target bonuses and what they imply about performace standard）萨班斯法案的实施导致了盈余管理的减少，并且企业相应的在奖金计划中增加了盈余的比重。但是并没有发现企业改变了补偿计划来补偿管理者所面临的更高的风险。为什么需要设置基于业绩的薪酬（代理理论，激励）影响因素（是否需要有侧重点？）影响因素来源股权集中度所有权较集中的公司,股东对管理者监督能力加强了,对管理者的激励的必要性就降低了,因此管理者股权激励较低( Chourou,Abaoubb, Saadi,2008) 。而所有权分散,股东约束弱化,激励性薪酬在总薪酬中的比重就较大( Lamia C. ,Ez- zeddine A. ,2008) 我国国有股一股独大是上市公司股权结构的显著特征,这就导致了国有控股公司的高管固定薪酬更高,而股权薪酬相对较弱。控股股东性质设置基于业绩薪酬是否会导致盈余管理（）业绩薪酬与盈余管理（）表1 结构决定因素变量变量定义出处备注strategyRD expense/salesThe choice of performacne measures in annual bonus contractsFinancial performanceOhlson’sbankrucymodel(1980)The choice of performacne measures in annual bonus contractsdecision-making authority -Uncertainty about environment 1.variance of his firm’s annual stock returns Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performace standardPrior studies also use the variance of annual stock returns as proxies for a firm’s growth opportunities (Smith and Watts 1992; Gaver and Gaver 1993), and measurement noise in market-based performance measures (Lambert and Larcker 1987), rather than as a proxy for an executive’s decision-making authority. Exogenous noise1行业过去5年的ros,roe,roa的标准差2.ros,roe,roa 的Fisher’z scoreThe choice of performacne measures in annual bonus contractsCEO influence1.独立董事比例，2. 内部董事中，由ceo委任的比例，3. 其他董事成员持股比例／CEO持股比例4.是否两职合一5机构投资者持股比例，The choice of performacne measures in annual bonus contracts长期激励高管股权比例The choice of performacne measures in annual bonus contracts成长性Market-to-book value(Smith and Watts (1992) Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performace standard股权性质是否国有－我认为应该要加入Size1.Lnasset2.Lnsales1.Earnings Targets and Annual Bonus Incentives2.Executive target bonuses and what they imply about performace standard行业-Earnings Targets and Annual Bonus Incentives表2 绩效薪酬是否影响盈余管理变量变量定义出处备注绩效薪酬比例绩效薪酬比例－－股权特征股权