reputation-based conditional interaction supports cooperation in well-mixed prisoner’s dilemmas基于声誉条件交互支持合作混合囚徒困境.pdfVIP

Reputation-Based Conditional Interaction Supports Cooperation in Well-Mixed Prisoner’s Dilemmas 1,2 2 2,3 2 4 Xiaojie Chen *, Alana Schick , Michael Doebeli , Alistair Blachford , Long Wang 1 Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria, 2 Department of Zoology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 3 Department of Mathematics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 4 Center for Systems and Control, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing, China Abstract In the well-mixed prisoner’s dilemma game, individuals are typically assumed to have no choice about whether to interact with other individuals in the population. In this paper, we instead consider reputation-based conditional interaction and its consequences for the evolution of cooperation. Each individual has a tolerance range, and only interacts with other individuals whose reputation lies within its tolerance range in a chosen sample of the population. Reputation contains information about the number of interaction partners an individual has just cooperated with. We find that the introduction of conditional interaction promotes cooperation in well-mixed populations, and there exist moderate tolerance ranges for which this effect is maximized. For a given tolerance range, there is a critical cost-to-benefit ratio below which cooperation can be promoted. Interestingly, we find that if cooperation evolves, different cooperators’ interaction clusters are typically maintained in the population, each around a different reputation level. We further investiga