公职人员败德行为及其监管的博弈分析（Game analysis of public servants immoral conduct and its supervision）.docVIP

公职人员败德行为及其监管的博弈分析（Game analysis of public servants immoral conduct and its supervision） Game analysis of public servants immoral conduct and its supervision Game analysis of public servants immoral conduct and its supervision 2008-12-20 15:11:08 [Abstract] from the perspective of game theory, this paper analyzes the mixed strategy of public servants immoral behavior and their supervision, and gives the Nash equilibrium solution and economic significance. On the basis of analysis, the author puts forward some policy suggestions on the supervision of moral behavior. Public servant; immoral behavior; supervision; game theory First, the introduction of game theory Game theory is the study of the behavior of the decision maker, the decision of the direct interaction, and the equilibrium of the decision. The most common is the Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium refers to a set of actions that satisfy a given opponent, and what each game does is the best strategy it can do for a non cooperative game. The basic assumption of game theory has two: one is to emphasize the individual rational behavior hypothesis, the parties in the decision, to fully consider the situation facing him, and that he must be able to fully consider the interaction between people, behavior and possible influence, and can make rational choice; two the objective function that all parties in the game to maximize their own choice, can make their own benefit maximization strategy. Game theory is the essence of economic subject, in the rational condition, behavior subject according to the given conditions and their behavior (strategy), to determine their own behavior (strategy), so as to maximize their own interests. The main public officials immoral behavior and its regulation is personnel and supervision office, they are generally rational behavior, clearly aware that having some important social status and salary income etc. the value of their own. But in the face of the complex external environment