考虑利润监控成本的供应链协调研究.docxVIP

毕业设计（论文）课 题 名 称 ： 考虑利润监控成本的 　 收益共享契约协调研究　学 院 ：　旭日工商管理学院 　　　专 业 ：　　物流管理 　姓名 ：曾立柱学 号 ：　　090750422　　 　　指 导 教 师 ：　　周建亨　　　　　　　　二零一二年十一月至二零一三年五月考虑利润监控成本的收益共享契约协调研究摘要近年来，随着全球经济一体化和商品经济的发展，供应链管理正在越来越多地受到专家和学者们的关注。供应链契约作为有效协调供应链内部经济利益的机制被广泛地应用于各行各业。面对复杂多变的外部环境，如何有效地采取措施，最大化程度地减少道德风险所带来的利益损害成为各专家学者们普遍关注的问题。本文在分析经典的收益共享契约的基础上，进一步讨论当零售商存在利润谎报行为（道德风险）的情况下，供应商应该实施什么样的监控力度，才能保证自己的损失降到最小。建立了存在谎报行为时以利润最大化为目标的数学模型，分别讨论了在有无谎报行为时供应商以及整个供应链的利润变化情况。得出了相关参数变化时，供应商的最优监控策略。当零售商存在谎报行为时，供应商的监控行为会使整个供应链的期望利润变小；若供应商不采取监控，则整个供应链的期望利润不变，但是利润会向零售商方面转移，使供应商方面产生损失。再者，本文通过运用MATLAB以及Visual Basic软件实现决策软件支持包的开发，对供应商的决策实现提供一定的支持。最后通过一个算例验证本文结论的正确性。关键词：收益共享，谎报，利润监控REVENUE-SHARING CONTRACT COORDINATION WITH REVENUE-MONITORING COSTAbstractIn recent years, with global economic integration and the development of commodity economy, supply chain management is increasingly attracting the attention of experts and scholars. As effective coordination mechanism tocoordinate the internal economic benefits of the whole supply chain, supply chain contracts have been widely used in all walks of life. Facing the complex and changeable external environment, how to effectively take measures to minimizeinterest loss brought by moral hazard becomes the experts and scholars’common concern.Based on the analysis of classic revenue-sharing contract, the paper further discusswhat monitoring option should be adopted by the supplier to ensure that its interests loss is minimized under the assumption that the retailer lies about its revenue(moral hazard).A mathematical model is established in order to maximize the profit when there is possibility that the retailer tells the lie. The paper also discusses the profits variations of different retailers and of the entire supply chains whether to consider moral hazard under different situations. When knowing the relative parameters, the best monitoring strategies of suppliers make sense. When retailers are lying about their revenue