风险规避下研发外包中隐性知识共享的关系契约激励.PDF

风险规避下研发外包中隐性知识共享的关系契约激励 宋寒，祝静，代应 (重庆理工大学 管理学院，重庆 400054；) 摘要：研发外包中隐性知识价值难以验证，以及服务商的风险规避行为，导致正式契约无法有效激励服务 商隐性知识共享。针对该问题，构建非正式的关系契约激励机制，分析了服务商风险规避度等外生变量对 关系契约的影响。研究表明，折现系数影响关系契约的可实施性，且临界折现系数是客户知识吸收能力的 增函数，是服务商知识共享成本系数、服务商风险规避度、方差的减函数。外生变量对最优关系契约的收 益共享系数的影响是单调的，而对固定支付的影响是非单调的，且在一定条件下固定支付表现服务商的反 向保证金支付。 关键词：研发外包；隐性知识共享；风险规避；关系契约 The relational incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing under risk averse in RD outsourcing Song Han, Dai Ying, Zhu Jing (1College of Management, Chongqing University of technology, Chongqing, 400054, China) Abstract: The unverified value of the tacit knowledge and the service risk-averse behavior in RD outsourcing may result that the formal contract cant incent the service provider to share tacit knowledge. Informal relational contract incentive mechanism is established in order to solve the problem, and the influences that the services risk-averse and other exogenous variables impact on the relational contract are analyzed. The research shows that the discount factor impact on the implementation of the relational contract and critical discount coefficient is the increasing function about the knowledge absorptive capacity of the customer and is the decreasing function about the coefficient of the knowledge sharing cost, service risk aversion, variance. The effects of the exogenous variable impact on the revenue sharing coefficient of the optimal relational contract are monotonous, however, the influences which it impacts on the fixed pay are non-monotonic, and the fixed pay performed the negative margin under certain conditions. Key Words: RD outsourcing; tacit knowledge sharing; risk averse; relational contract 中图分类号：F224.32 文献标识码：A 1 引言 研发外包是指企业以契约的形式，将知识创造、技术创新、科技攻关等研发工作委托给专业的研发服