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MIT博弈论课件GT_fall2003_lecture_2
Last Time:
Defined knowledge, common knowledge, meet (of
partitions), and reachability.
Reminders:
• E is common knowledge at ω if ω∈K ∞(E ) .
I
• “Reachability Lemma” :ω ∈M (ω) if there is a
chain of states ω ω ,ω,...ω ω such that for
0 1 m
each ω there is a player i(k) s.t.
k
h (ω ) h (ω ) :
i ( k ) k i (k ) k +1
• Theorem: Event E is common knowledge at ω
iff M (ω) ⊆E .
How does set of NE change with information
structure?
Suppose there is a finite number of payoff matrices
1 L
u ,...,u for finite strategy sets S ,...,S
1 I
State space Ω, common prior p, partitions H , and a
i
map λso that payoff functions in state ω are uλ(ω) (.) ;
the strategy spaces are maps from H into S .
i i
When the state space is finite, this is a finite game,
and we know that NE is u.h.c. and generically l.h.c.
in p. In particular, it will be l.h.c. at strict NE.
The “coordinated attack” game
A B A B
A 8, 8 - 10, 1 A 0, 0 - 10, 1
B 1,- 10 0, 0 B 1,- 10 8, 8
a b
u u
Ω= 0,1,2,….
In state 0: payoff functions are given by matrix b
u ;
In all other states payoff functions are given by a
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