Barrett Stanford Prediction.In Pfeifer Sarkar,The Philosophy Of Science.An Encyclopedia资料.pdfVIP

Draft: Revisedversionto appearin ThePhilosophyof Science:An Encyclopedia,ed. JessicaPfeiferandSahotraSarkar. New York: Routledge,Inc.) Prediction Jeff BarrettandP. Kyle Stanford Departmentof Logic andPhilosophyof Science Universityof California,Irvine Introduction Whetherwe predictrainfall, recessions,or racetrackwinners,predictinganevent or stateof affairsoften, perhapseventypically, involvessayingthat it will happenbefore it occurs,andthis commonassociationis presumablyresponsiblefor the ideathat predictionsmustbeaboutthe future. But in scientificcontextswe often characterizea theoryspredictionsasits implicationsor entailmentswithout regardfor temporal constraints,aswhenwe saya successfultheoryof cosmologypredictsthe existenceof cosmicbackgroundradiationat all times. We alsousethe languageof predictionto describedeclarativeassertionsaboutpastandpresenteventsmadein light of a theory,as whenwe useevolutionarytheoryto predictthattheremustbetransitionalfossils connectingreptilesandmammals.A temporalelementmight bepreservedby insisting thatthesearereally casesof postdiction or retrodiction or evenshorthandpredictions aboutfuture evidentialfmdings. But perhapsthesecomfortableextensionsof our predictivelanguagemorenaturallysuggestthatthe centralelementin predictionis not temporalbut epistemic. To predictis to makea claim aboutmattersthat arenot already known,not necessarilyabouteventsthat havenotyet transpired. Of coursepredictioncannotbeassimpleasthat, becauseoneway to know somethingis to predictit correctlyon the basisof a well-conflrlnedtheory. Predictive languageseemsmostappropriatein caseswhenwe makeclaimsaboutunknownmatters usingtools (like inductivegeneralization,scientifictheorizing,or sheerguesswork)that canbecontrastedwith moredirect methodsof ascertainingthe sameinformation(like simply observ