对信息披露和财务报表关注的有限性[文献翻译].doc

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 题 目 我国上市公司资产质量信息的披露研究 专 业 会 计 学 外文题目 Limited attention, Information Disclosure and Financial Reporting 外文出处 Fisher College of Business 外文作者 David Hirshleifer and Siew Hong Teoh 原文： Limited attention, Information Disclosure and Financial Reporting Abstract This paper models firms’ choices between alternative means of presenting information, and the effects of different presentations on market prices when investors have limited attention and processing power. In a market equilibrium with partially attentive investors, we examine the effects of alternative: levels of discretion in pro forma earnings disclosure, methods of accounting for employee option compensation, and degrees of aggregation in reporting. We derive empirical implications relating pro forma adjustments, option compensation, the growth, persistence, and informativeness of earnings, short-run managerial incentives, and other firm characteristics to stock price reactions, misevaluation, long-run abnormal returns, and corporate decisions. Key Words: limited attention, behavioral accounting, investor psychology, capital markets, accounting regulation, disclosure, market efficiency 1 Introduction Firms and regulators care not just about the information made publicly available to investors, but the form in which it is revealed. One issue of great concern to practitioners is whether information items should be recognized as part of earnings, or merely disclosed as a footnote. Another is the prominence with which different kinds of information are displayed in financial statements. There is also intense concern as to the form of disclosure, even when the information content of the alternative formats is identical. Evidently regulators and commentators think that investors are imperfect processors of publicly available information. Such concerns are reflected in the structure of accounting regula