在组奖励中的激励强度的决定因素[文献翻译]2011-03-07.docVIP

外文文献翻译译文 一、外文原文： 原文： DETERMINANTS OF INCENTIVE INTENSITY IN GROUPBASED REWARDS THEORY AND HYPOTHESES Agency Theory and Incentive Intensity A fundamental argument in the agency theory literature and in much of the compensation literature is that the incentive intensity of rewards—often measured as the variable portion of pay—enhances employee contributions to performance. Incentive-intensive pay increases effort and may increase the talent level of those attracted to a compensation plan. Higher incentive intensity increases the marginal gains in income that employees receive from increased effort. If increased effort has physical or psychological costs, agents will choose levels of effort whereby the marginal gain from effort equals its marginal cost. Therefore, when pay plans are more incentive-intensive, employees reach higher levels of effort before deciding that these increases fail to compensate for their personal costs. Research in a variety of fields confirms this relationship between incentive intensity and effort (e.g., Ehrenberg Bognanno, 1990; Landau Leventhal, 1976; Zenger, 1992). Higher incentive intensity may also help companies lure and keep talented workers (Lazear, 1986; Rynes, 1987; Zenger, 1994). Given the randomness of measured performance, as incentive intensity rises, so does the uncertainty of an individuals pay. The higher the incentive intensity, the more likely it is that only the very best performers (those who have the highest probability of generating strong measured performance) will find it efficient to assume the risk of an incentive-intensive contract. As suggested in empirical studies, employees with lower ability—those unlikely to generate high performance—will prefer contracts that place less emphasis on performance (Cable Judge, 1994; U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1988;Zenger, 1994). Incentive intensity in group rewards should function much like incentive intensity in individual rewards: higher levels should motivate eff