德里达《声音与现象》英文版Speech and Phenomena.doc

Speech and Phenomena: Introduction to the Problem of Signs in Husser’s Phenomenology When we read this word I without knowing who wrote it, it is perhaps not meaningless, but is at least estranged from its normal meaning. Logical Investigations A name on being mentioned reminds us of the Dresden gallery and of our last visit there; we wander through the rooms and stop in front of a painting by Teniers which represents a gallery of paintings. Let us further suppose that the paintings of this gallery would represent in their turn paintings, which, on their part, exhibited readable inscriptions and so forth. Ideas I I have spoken both of sound and voice, I mean to say that the sound was one of distinct, of even wonderfully, thrillingly distinct, syllabification. M. Valdemar spoke, obviously in reply to the question. . . . He now said: Yes;—no;—I have been sleeping—and now—now—I am dead** Poe, The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar Introduction THE Logical Investigations (1900-1901) opened a path which, as we know, the whole of phenomenology has followed. Up to the fourth edition (1928) there was no fundamental change, no determined re-examination. Some touching up, certainly, and a powerful work of explication: Ideas I and Formal and Transcendental Logic develop without break the concepts of intentional or noematic sense, the difference between the two strata of analytics in the strong sense (the pure forms of judgments and consequence-logic), and suppress the deductivist or nomological form which had hitherto limited his concept of science in general.1 In the Crisis and texts of the same period, particularly in The Origin of Geometry, the conceptual premises of the Investigations are still at work, notably when they concern all the problems of signification and language in general. In this area more than elsewhere, a patient reading of the Investigations would show the germinal structure of the whole of Husserls thought. On each page the necessity—or the implic