37. Human Rights in Kantian Mode A Sketch 38. Why there Cannot be a Truly Kantian Theory of Human Rights推荐.pdfVIP

37 Human Rights in Kantian Mode A Sketch Katrin Flikschuh I. Reservations about Human Rights Many legal and political theorists think the idea of human rights intuitive and their moral and political importance self-evident. Others worry that the concept is badly delimited and human rights’ moral and political appeal overrated. In current human rights relevant debates, the latter are the reservations of a dwindling minor- ity. Philosophical discussions about global poverty alleviation, about state legitimacy, about international law and humanitarian intervention make ubiquitous appeal to human rights: the idea plays an increasingly central conceptual and justificatory role in these and related debates. In general, recurrent appeal to a single concept as solvent to a diverse range of theo- retical and practical problems should be treated with caution. The increasingly routine appeal to human rights in global justice debates is particularly disconcerting given that debate’s acknowledged state of flux following nearly five hundred years of sophis- ticated political theorizing firmly within the boundaries of the self-contained territo - rial state. Under conditions of such comprehensive change and uncertainty appeal to all-too-readily available practical or theoretical remedies seems ill-advised. The very allure of human rights theorizing here counsels circumspection with regard to their possible illusionary quality as quick fixes to complex global problems we confront.1 Since my brief here concerns human rights, I shall not simply set them aside. Still, everything I say here should be read in the light of the reservations just noted. I have a strong sense of my lack of grasp of the concept: whenever I try to think it, I over- whelmin