组织的经济学与管理学（英文）ch07_Hidden_characteristics_problem教材教学课件.ppt

Chapter 7 Hidden characteristics problem George Hendrikse;Figure III: Positioning of Part III ;Welfare theorem;Keywords;Incentives;Agent has superior information (about preferences or costs) before a contract is determined by the principal in a hidden characteristics problem, i.e. there is an ex ante information asymmetry. ;Two hidden characteristics problems;Example: Dental insurance;Implications;Observation ;Nash equilibrium;Pareto inefficiency: adverse selection;Figure 7.1: The order of decisions in the hidden characteristics problem;Example: Insurance;Buyer with characteristics X will buy insurance when: P ? X + V X ? P - V;Suppose V = 1 and X = Xg = 3, 50% population is type G  Xb = 7, 50% population is type B;How does the insurance premium P in equilibrium depend on the structure of information?;Figure 7.2: Decision order and payoffs in the insurance with complete information;Complete contingent contract;Figure 7.3: Equilibrium in the insurance market with complete information ;Nash equilibrium;Figure 7.4: Asymmetric information / hidden characteristic in the insurance problem;Complete contract;Figure 7.5: Acceptance decisions and payoffs in the insurance problem;The profit maximising complete contract of the principal is therefore [8]. ;Nash equilibrium;Observation;General tendencies in markets with hidden characteristics;Main question;Solutions for the hidden characteristics problem are geared towards the ingredients of the model.;Three kinds of solutions to adverse selection problems;1. Eliminate the problem;2. Self selection;If contracts consist of two variables, then the choice of a particular contract may reveal something about the hidden characteristics of this person.;Suppose that there is a contract variable which the agent does not like, i.e. bad 1, and a good contract variable for the agent, i.e. good 2. Preferences regarding these two contract variables are depicted with indifference curves. There are two types of individu