产业组织理论双语第二讲.ppt

Chapter 3 The Firm The relationship between market and firm Do Firms Maximize Profits? Why Are Firms Different? 3.1 企业与市场的关系 自科斯提出企业问题以来，对于企业的研究是沿着两个方向进行的：一是说明企业与市场的关系，即企业的边界问题；二是解释企业内部的产权结构、激励机制、管理模式等现象。我们这里只讨论企业与市场的关系问题。 交易费用(Transaction Costs) 科斯在《企业的性质》(The Nature of the Firm)（1937）一文中说：在企业之外，价格变动决定生产；在企业之内，企业家指挥生产。 按照科斯的见解，是因为利用市场价格机制是有交易费用的，而利用企业组织生产可以节约交易费用。 罗纳德·科斯（RONALD H.COASE）,英国人,由于他揭示并澄清了经济制度结构和函数中交易费用和产权的重要性，获得1991年诺贝尔经济学奖。 Search and information costs are costs such as those incurred in determining that the required good is available on the market, who has the lowest price, etc. Bargaining costs are the costs required to come to an acceptable agreement with the other party to the transaction, drawing up an appropriate contract and so on. Policing and enforcement costs are the costs of making sure the other party sticks to the terms of the contract, and taking appropriate action (often through the legal system) if this turns out not to be the case. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) explain the increased cost of management as due to the incentives of employees to provide false information beneficial to themselves, resulting in costs to managers of filtering information, and often the making of decisions without full information. This grows worse with firm size and more layers in the hierarchy. Since the reason for the firms being is to have lower costs than the market, the upper limit on the firms size is set by costs rising to the point where internalizing an additional transaction equals the cost of making that transaction in the market. (At the lower limit, the firm’s costs exceed the market’s costs, and it does not come into existence.) 交易费用概念的具体化 究竟是哪些交易行为不能有效地利用价格机制来完成？ 又是什么因素导致利用价格机制来完成这些交易需要付出高昂的成本？ 威廉姆森和克莱因等人将企业看作是一个以纵向一体化为基本特征，拥有专用性的物质资本和人力资本的实体。 与这一特征对应的是若干潜在的双边垄断和特质交易行为，如果将这些行为放到市场上用价格机制来协调，将不可避免地遇到人们机会主义(Opportunism)行为所带来的高额交易成本。 资产专用性(asset specificity)及其相关的机会主义行为都不是导致企业产生的充分条件！ 只有当企业的行为是面向未来变化的市场环境，而又不可能用完备性的合同规范各方的利益和行为