中微课件范里安版MicroCh28章节幻灯片.pptVIP

Pure Strategies Player B Player A Player A’s has been thought of as choosingto play either U or D, but no combination ofboth; that is, as playing purely U or D.U and D are Player A’s pure strategies. L R U D (3,9) (0,0) (1,8) (2,1) Pure Strategies Player B Player A Similarly, L and R are Player B’s purestrategies. L R U D (3,9) (0,0) (1,8) (2,1) Pure Strategies Player B Player A Consequently, (U,L) and (D,R) are purestrategy Nash equilibria. Must every gamehave at least one pure strategy Nashequilibrium? L R U D (3,9) (0,0) (1,8) (2,1) Pure Strategies Player B Player A Here is a new game. Are there any purestrategy Nash equilibria? (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U D L R Pure Strategies Player B Player A Is (U,L) a Nash equilibrium? No. Is (U,R) a Nash equilibrium? No.Is (D,L) a Nash equilibrium? No.Is (D,R) a Nash equilibrium? No. (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U D L R Pure Strategies Player B Player A So the game has no Nash equilibria in purestrategies. Even so, the game does have aNash equilibrium, but in mixed strategies. (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U D L R Mixed Strategies Instead of playing purely Up or Down, Player A selects a probability distribution (pU,1-pU), meaning that with probability pU Player A will play Up and with probability 1-pU will play Down. Player A is mixing over the pure strategies Up and Down. The probability distribution (pU,1-pU) is a mixed strategy for Player A. Mixed Strategies Similarly, Player B is mixing over the pure strategies Left and Right. The probability distribution (pL,1-pL) is a mixed strategy for Player B. Mixed Strategies Player A This game has no pure strategy Nash equilibria but it does have a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. How is itcomputed? (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U D L R Player B Mixed Strategies Player A (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U,pU D,1-pU L,pL R,1-pL Player B Mixed Strategies Player A If B plays Left her expected payoff is (1,2) (0,4) (0,5) (3,2) U,pU D,1-pU L,pL R,1-pL Player B Mixed Strategies Player A