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“剩 余”算法题目__答案整理.pdf

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题目序号一览: 1.2 1.3 2.1 2.5 2.6(Programming) 3.1 3.6(Programming) 4.3 4.6(Programming) 4.7 5.6 5.7 6.4 6.5 7.6 8.1 1.2 Stable Matching In the Gale-Shapley algorithm of the Stable Matching Problem, an unmarried man proposes to his highest-ranked woman to whom he has not yet proposed, woman never proposes to man, and the algorithm yields the stable matching S. Now, suppose an unmarried woman proposes to her highest-ranked man to whom she has not yet proposed, man never proposes to woman, and the algorithm yields the stable matching S’. True or false? For every instance of the Stable Matching Problem, S = S’. Write a program to implement the above two algorithms in your favorite language, and give your answer based-on your implementation. Solution: False. In the Gale-Shapley algorithm of the Stable Matching Problem, when man proposes, man is able to choose his best valid pair. However, It is unfair for woman. In this problem, when woman propose, woman is able to choose her best valid pair. So not for every instance of the Stable Matching Problem , S=S’. For example: Case1: Preference chart for man m1 w1 w2 m2 w2 w1 Preference chart for woman w1 m2 m1 w2 m1 m2 When man propose, the stable matching is m1w1 m2w2 When woman propose, the stable matching is m1w2 m2w1 Then S≠S′ Case 2: Preference chart for man m1 w1 w2 m2 w2 w1 Preference chart for woman w1 m1

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