上财高级微观经济学III作业和答案.pdf

Advanced Microeconomic Theory 3 Fall 2009 Problem Set 1 Due on 9/17 1. Discrete Hotelling Model: There are two players. Each player i is to choose an integer xi between 0 and 10. The payo§ function of player i is 8 x +x i j if x x 2 i j u (x ; x ) = 0:5 if xi = xj : i i j : x +x 1 i j if x x 2 i j What are the rationalizable strategies of this game? 2. Consider a ìBertrandîlike game. There are two players; each player i is to name an integer xi between x and x. The player i whose number is the smaller receives a payo§ of xi c; the other player gets 0. If both players choose the same number x, then each receives 0:5 (x c). (a) Suppose c = 0:5 and x = 1 and x = 100. Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (b) Suppose c = 0:5 and x = 100 and x = 100. Find the set of rationalizable strategies. (c) Suppose c = 0 and x = 100 and x = 100. Find the set of rationalizable strategies. 3. Suppose we Örst eliminate all weakly dominated strategies in Q@. What would be the set of rationalizable strategies for the remaining strategies in each of the cases in Q2?