股权激励与公司绩效外文文献中英文翻译.docx

外文文献翻译原文及译文标题： CEO Personal Wealth, Equity Incentives and Firm performance 作者：Anna ELSILA, Juha-Pekka KALLUNKI, Henrik NILSSON, Petri SAHLSTROM 期刊： Corporate Governance: An International Review, 第21卷，第1期，26-41 年份： 2013 字数：译文6388字原文 CEO Personal Wealth, Equity Incentives and Firm performance Anna ELSILA, Juha-Pekka KALLUNKI, Henrik NILSSON, Petri SAHLSTROM Abstract: In this paper, we employ unique data on the personal wealth of the CEOs’ of the listed Swedish firms to explore whether the proportion of CEO’s total wealth invested in her firm increases her incentives and, consequently, the performance of her firm. Consistent with this hypothesis our results show that the greater is the proportion of CEO’s wealth tied to her firm, the greater is the accounting profitability. Our results are robust for different alternative estimation methods and when various firm differences are controlled for. Keywords: Incentives, executive compensation, profitability 1. Introduction A central prediction from theoretical agency models is that managerial ownership such as the CEO ownership of the firm increases management’s incentives and, consequently, the performance of the firm (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, empirical evidence from testing this prediction is mixed (for a review, see e.g. Core, Guay and Larcker, 2003). The lack of the empirical evidence on the positive relationship between the managerial ownership and the firm performance is explained by econometric problems in estimating the true managerial ownership-performance relationship (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) and by already-optimal levels of managerial ownership, which leaves no room for the cross-sectional variation in the ownership-performance relationship (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). These theoretical and empirical studies have focused on the CEO ownership as a fraction of the firm, and they usually pay no attention to the role of the manager’s ownership as a proportion of outside wealth in determining i