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课程简介精品
2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good The normal-form representation: Set of players: { Person 1, Person 2} Sets of strategies: S1=[0, w1], S2=[0, w2] Payoff functions: u1(c1, c2) = v1(c1 + c2) + w1 – c1 u2(c1, c2) = v2(c1 + c2) + w2 – c2 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good How to find a Nash equilibrium Find the contribution pair (c1*, c2*) such that c1* is person 1’s best response to person 2’s contribution c2* and c2* is person 2’s best response to person 1’s contribution c1* That is, c1* solves Max u1(c1, c2*) = v1(c1 + c2*) + w1 – c1 subject to 0 ? c1 ? w1 and c2* solves Max u2(c1*, c2) = v2(c1* + c2) + w2 – c2 subject to 0 ? c2 ? w2 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good How to find a Nash equilibrium Solve person 1’s maximization problem Max u1(c1, c2*) = v1(c1 + c2*) + w1 – c1 subject to 0 ? c1 ? w1 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good How to find a Nash equilibrium Solve person 2’s maximization problem Max u2(c1*, c2) = v2(c1* + c2) + w2 – c2 subject to 0 ? c2 ? w2 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good How to find a Nash equilibrium The contribution pair (c1*, c2*) is a Nash equilibrium if 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 Contributing to a public good Best response function Person 1’s best function to person 2’s contribution c2: R1(c2) = r1 – c2 if c2 r1; =0, if c2 ? r1 Person 2’s best function to person 1’s contribution c1: R2(c1) = r2 – c1 if c1 r2 ; =0, if c1 ? r2 c1 c2 r2 r1 r2 r1 (r1, 0) is a NE Suppose that r1 r2 The Intuition: higher valuation 2009, Huazhong University of Science and Technology Game Theory--Chapter 1 The problems of commons
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