Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs-fringe…资料.pdf

Energy Economics 22 2000 209 223 Open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel-vs.-fringe model a b,c, d Fons Groot , Cees Withagen , Aart de Zeeuw aInstitute for Enironmental Studies, De Boelelaan 1115, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands b Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg Uniersity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands cDepartment of Economics and Tinbergen Institute, Vrije Uniersiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands d Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg Uniersity, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands Abstract In this paper the binding-contracts open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium in the cartel- vs.-fringe model of the supply side of a market for a raw material from an exhaustible natural resource is reconsidered. It is shown that the equilibrium for this model differs from what the previous literature on this model suggests. In particular, the equilibrium price trajectory can display discontinuities. 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classifications: Q3; C7 Keywords: Cartel-vs.-fringe; Von Stackelberg equilibrium 1. Introduction The treatment of duopolistic markets for raw materials from an exhaustible natural resource dates back to Hotelling’s Hotelling, 1931 seminal paper. Because of the evident relevance to real world phenomena such as the market for crude oil, this theory was revived recently and was extended to oligopolistic markets with Corresponding author. Tel.