chapter_17 Markets with Asymmetric Information 平狄克微观英文版教材.pptVIP

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chapter_17 Markets with Asymmetric Information 平狄克微观英文版教材.ppt

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chapter_17 Markets with Asymmetric Information 平狄克微观英文版教材.ppt

Chapter 1 31 36 36 39 40 40 41 42 43 44 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 The efficiency wage theory can explain the presence of unemployment and wage discrimination. In developing countries, productivity depends on the wage rate for nutritional reasons. Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage Theory The shirking model can be better used to explain unemployment and wage discrimination in the United States. Assumes perfectly competitive markets However, workers can work or shirk. Since performance information is limited, workers may not get fired. Asymmetric Information in Labor Markets: Efficiency Wage Theory Without shirking, the market wage is w*, and full-employment exists at L* Demand for Labor w* L* SL Unemployment in a Shirking Model Quantity of Labor Wage No-Shirking Constraint The no-shirking constraint gives the wage necessary to keep workers from shirking. we Le At the equilibrium wage, We the firm hires Le workers creating unemployment of L* - Le. Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor Company Labor turnover at Ford 1913: 380% 1914: 1000% Average pay = $2 - $3 Ford increased pay to $5 Efficiency Wages at Ford Motor Company Results Productivity increased 51% Absenteeism had been halved Profitability rose from $30 million in 1914 to $60 million in 1916. Summary Asymmetric information creates a market failure in which bad products tend to drive good products out of the market. Insurance markets frequently involve asymmetric information because the insuring party has better information about the risk involved than the insurance company. Summary Asymmetric information may make it costly for the owners of firms to monitor accurately the behavior of the firm’s manager. Asymmetric information can explain why labor markets have substantial unemployment when some workers are actively seeking work. End of Chapter 17 Markets with Asymmetric Information 1 2 3 4 5 6 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 Moral Hazard Moral haza