外文翻译---分析投标商远期合同的投标策略.docxVIP

Analysis of equilibrium about bidding strategy ofsupplierswith future contractsZhiqiang Yuan *, Dong Liu, Chuanwen JiangElectric Power School, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai , PR ChinaReceived 6 May 2005; accepted 9 August 2006Available online 2 October 2006AbstractIn this paper, the supply function model is employed to simulate the bidding strategy of suppliers in the power pool, and models of the supply function with future contracts are presented. It is proved that only one of the parameters between slope and intercept of the bidding curve is an independent variable in order to achieve definite equilibrium. In the meantime, the equilibria of the bidding strategy about suppliers are studied when different intercepts of the bidding curve are chosen. Some examples are employed to study the Nash equilibrium strategies of suppliers with different future contracts in various bidding strategy models. The results show that the equilibria are different in different bidding strategy models, but the future contracts can effectively make spot prices decrease in all the models.1. IntroductionThe electric power industry worldwide is experiencing unprecedented restructuring from the traditional integrated regulation monopoly to a competitive power market. The object of deregulation is to introduce a competition mechanism into the power market and provide incentives for efficient operation of the power industry, eventually reducing the market price. The ideal market is a perfect competitive market in which participants bid their marginal cost into the market. Consequently, the market price is low in this kind of market. However, the electricity market is different from other merchandise markets. In the power market, only a few suppliers can provide power services in some geographic region. This is due to the restriction of some factors, such as large investment scale, small demand elasticity, transmission constraints and no largely storable electricity. Consequently, th