法律概念分析霍菲尔德267.pptVIP

沒有所謂的物權 Hohfeld demonstrates that this way of understanding rights in general is wrong. In particular, Hohfeld demonstrates that there is no such thing as a legal relation between a person and a thing, since a legal relation always operates between two people. As the legal relations between any two people are complex, it is helpful to break them down into their simplest forms. * fhfh gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; gjhhj jklk; 法律概念分析霍菲爾德 楊智傑 老師 * fhfh 生平 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (1879-1918) was an American jurist. He was the author of the seminal Fundamental Legal Conceptions, As Applied in Judicial Reasoning and Other Legal Essays, published in 1919. During his life, he published only a handful of law journal articles. At his death, the material forming the basis of Fundamental Legal Conceptions was derived from two articles in the Yale Law Journal (1913) and (1917) that had been partially revised with a view to publication. * fhfh 權利的性質 Editorial work was undertaken to complete the revisions and the book was published with the inclusion of the manuscript notes that Hohfeld had left, plus seven other essays. The work remains a powerful contribution to modern understanding of the nature of rights and the implications of liberty. To reflect this continuing importance, a chair at Yale University is named after him, which is currently held by Jules Coleman. * fhfh 「權利」一詞的混用 Hohfeld noticed that even respected jurists conflate various meanings of the term right, sometimes switching senses of the word several times in a single sentence. He wrote that such imprecision of language indicated a concomitant imprecision of thought, and thus also of the resulting legal conclusions. In order to both facilitate reasoning and clarify rulings, he attempted to disambiguate the term rights by breaking it into ei