不对称信息对企业所得税逃避及税收筹划影响博弈分析.docVIP

不对称信息对企业所得税逃避及税收筹划影响博弈分析 　　摘要：在纳税人存在多种应纳税所得时，将企业治理结构中的委托-代理关系作为核心要素，在集中考虑税收逃避与税务筹划双重行为的基础上，通过对“税收征管机关-纳税人”之间的征纳行为进行刻画，构建了不完全信息多阶段博弈模型。在无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态下，得出了博弈均衡解并分别进行了分析；进一步地，通过无委托-代理与委托-代理两种状态的比较，指出了委托-代理会带来效率损失问题。分析了一系列税收征管变量的经济效应，指出税率、逃税惩罚率、审计率等的提升会显著地降低企业主与管理人员的期望收益，但会促使企业为减少税负而进行税收逃避，加大了其收益的波动风险。同时指出了所得税逃避并不适合日益强化的税收征管环境。为此，在委托-代理环境下，企业主通过设计相关契约及加强监督等措施，一方面，可以有效规避管理人员的税收逃避行为，鼓励其税务筹划行为；另一方面，可以提升企业主与管理人员的期望收益。 　　关键词：委托-代理；不对称信息；所得税逃避；所得税筹划；博弈分析 　　中图分类号：F812.42 文献标识码：A 文章编号：1001-8409（2013）05-0086-07 　　Game Analysis on the Influence of the Tax Evasion and Tax 　　Planning of the Corporate Income by Asymmetric Information 　　MA Jia-xia，LUO Jian-lib 　　（a.School of Oujiang；b.School of Business，Wenzhou University Wenzhou 325035） 　　Abstract：when multiply taxable income for taxpayer existed，the principal-agent relationship at the corporate governance structure as a core element，the dual-action of tax evasion and tax planning being considered centralized，through the levying-paying action description betweenthe tax collection authority and the taxpayer，one multi-stage game model under incomplete information environment is established.The equilibrium game solutions are obtained，analyzed by followed under the principal-agent state and without principal-agent state.Further，by using two state comparisons between principal-agent state and without principal-agent state，the loss of efficiency caused by principal-agent is pointed out.The economic effects with series of variables concerning tax-collecting isanalyzed.Although the expected return for the business owners and managers will be reduced significantly by the improvement of tax rate，tax evasion penalty rates，audit rates，the fluctuation risk will be enlarged because the enterprise want to reduce its tax burden by using the way of tax evasion.And the income tax evasion，which isn’t suitable for increasingly sophisticated tax-collecting environment，is pointed out.Under the principal - agent environment，by designing relate