Breaking the O(n2) Bit Barrier Scalable Byzantine Agreement 突破O（N2）位垒的可扩展的拜占庭协议.pptVIP

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2018-06-24 发布于四川
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Breaking the O(n2) Bit Barrier Scalable Byzantine Agreement 突破O（N2）位垒的可扩展的拜占庭协议.ppt

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Breaking the O(n2) Bit Barrier Scalable Byzantine Agreement 突破O（N2）位垒的可扩展的拜占庭协议

Breaking the O(n2) Bit Barrier: Scalable Byzantine Agreement with an Adaptive Adversary Byzantine Agreement Each proc. starts with a bit; Goal: All procs. decide the same bit, which must match at least one of their initial bits. t= # of bad procs. controlled by malicious Adversary Byzantine agreement for large scale networks If you could do it practically, you would! Why? Protecting against malicious attacks Organizing large communities of users Mediation in game theory Fundamental building block Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous w/ rushing adv. Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchronous Private random bits Private channels Adaptive adversary Resilience: t n(1/3-?) Limit on # bits sent by good procs.: Bad procs can send any #. Our Model Procs={1,2,…,n} Message passing: A knows if it receives from B Synchron