上市家族企业高管薪酬激励与代理成本关系的实证-研究.pdfVIP

摘要 上市家族企业高管薪酬激励与代理成本关系的实证研究 摘要 民营经济是我国国民经济体系的一支重要力量，而家族企业是民营经济的主体，家 族企业的生存和发展状况已引起社会的广泛关注。随着所有权和控制权的分离，控制和 降低代理成本成为家族企业的重要议题。现代企业的管理者在企业的经营发展中具有十 分重要的作用，对管理人员的激励成为企业的核心问题之一。设计和实施能够降低家族 企业代理成本的高管薪酬激励机制已成为一个突出的研究课题。基于此，本文以我国 483 家上市家族企业 2010 年的数据作为样本，对家族企业高管薪酬激励和代理成本的关系 作了较详细的研究和探讨。 本文首先通过对我国上市家族企业 2010 年高管薪酬数据的研究，发现我国上市家 族企业高管薪酬存在高管人力资本价值体现不充分、薪酬结构单一等问题。在此基础上， 探讨了我国上市家族企业高管薪酬激励与代理成本之间的关系，研究表明：（1）上市家 族企业高管人员的年度报酬、持股比例和薪酬差距都与代理成本负相关。（2 ）对家族经 理人和职业经理人薪酬激励降低代理成本效果的分类研究表明，职业经理人薪酬机制的 效果更明显。（3 ）家族控制权与现金流权的偏离系数越大，企业高管薪酬机制对代理成 本的作用效果将会减弱。 关键词：代理成本，家族企业，高管薪酬激励，实证研究 I Abstract STUDY ON THE RELATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION INCENTIVE OF LISTED FAMILY FIRMS AND AGENCY COSTS ABSTRACT Private economy is a major force of national economic system, and the family business is the main body of the private economy, family business’s survive and thrive has aroused wide concern. With the separation of ownership and control right, reducing agency costs has become an important family business issues. Managers play a very important role in the modern business, incentive for managers has become one of the core issue. Design and implement a plan to reduce the agency costs of family business executive pay has become a prominent research topic. Based on this, the paper take the data of 483 listed family firms in 2010 as samples, have made a more detailed study and discussion of the relationship between family business executive compensation and the agency costs. At first, this paper analyzed the data of China listed family firms by 2010, found that the executive compensation of listed family firms is not