电力行业改革及市场分析的方法与模型研究-系统工程专业论文.docx

电力行业改革及市场分析的方法与模型研究-系统工程专业论文.docx

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电力行业改革及市场分析的方法与模型研究-系统工程专业论文

华 华 中 科 技 大 学 硕 士 学 位 论 文 II II Abstract With the thorough development that reform open, our country of electricity industry business get the high-speed development. And the reform of the electricity industry also obtains the graveness to make progress. For making the our country electricity industry business get the better development, this paper tallies up the reform of the foreign electricity industry, then presents three empirical studies based on the privatization and restructuring of the electricity industry. This paper reports the results of an empirical study of market power in the newly-created electricity spot market. Estimates of price-cost markups are derived using both highly reliable information on marginal costs and several New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approaches that do not rely on cost data. All estimates indicate that, though the two dominant suppliers in this industry are charging prices above marginal costs, the prices are not nearly as high as theoretical models of the spot market predict. Regulatory constraints, the threat of entry and financial contracts between the suppliers and their customers are considered as possible explanations for the restrained prices. From a methodological perspective, the similarity between the NEIO estimates and the measured markups confirm that NEIO techniques can yield reliable estimates of the degree of market power in an industry. This thesis considers the bidding behavior of participants in the daily auction to supply electricity in England and Wales. Theoretical work on uniform-price multi-unit auctions similar to the one considered suggests that bidders selling more than one unit of a good have an incentive to increase the prices they did at high quantities. If a bid sets the equilibrium price, the bidder receives a higher price for that unit as well as for all inframarginal units. I find evidence of strategic bid increases. First, plants that are likely to be used after a number of other p

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