福岛核电站泄露程揭秘.pptVIP

The Fukushima DaiichiIncident The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design Fukushima Daiichi (Plant I) Unit I - GE Mark I BWR (439?MW), Operating since 1971 Unit II-IV - GE Mark I BWR (760?MW), Operating since 1974 The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design Building structure Concrete Building Steel-framed Service Floor The Fukushima Daiichi Incident – Dr. Matthias Braun - * - p.* Engineering Projects Organization The information in this document is AREVA property and is intended solely for the addressees. Reproduction and distribution are prohibited. Thank you Plant Design Accident Progression Radiological releases Spent fuel pools Sources of Information Matthias Braun PEPA4-G, AREVA–NP GmbH Matthias.Braun@AREVA.com /wiki/Browns_Ferry_Nuclear_Power_Plant Containment Pear-shaped Dry-Well Torus-shaped Wet-Well The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design Service Floor The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design Lifting the Containment closure head The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design Reactor Service Floor(Steel Construction) Concrete Reactor Building(secondary Containment) Reactor Core Reactor Pressure Vessel Containment (Dry well) Containment (Wet Well) / Condensation Chamber Spend Fuel Pool Fresh Steam line Main Feedwater The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Accident progression 11.3.2011 14:46 - Earthquake Magnitude 9 Power grid in northern Japan fails Reactors itself are mainly undamaged SCRAM Power generation due to Fission of Uranium stops Heat generation due to radioactive Decay of Fission Products After Scram ~6% After 1 Day ~1% After 5 Days ~0.5% The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 2. Accident progression Containment Isolation Closing of all non-safety related Penetrations of the containment Cuts off Machine hall If containment isolation succeeds, a large early release of fission products is highly unlikely Diesel generators start Emergency Core cooling systems are supplied Plant is