应用经济学家的博弈论 Game Theory for Applied Economists ，_Gibbons.pdf

Game Theory for Applied Economists Robert Gibbon s Princeton University Press Princeton, New Jersey Contents Static Games of Complete Information 1 1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium 2 l.l.A Normal-Form Representation of Games . . . . 2 l.l.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies 4 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium 8 1.2 Applications 14 1.2.A Coumot Model of Duopoly 14 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly 21 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration 22 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons 27 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium 29 1.3.A Mixed Strategies 29 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium 33 1.4 Further Reading 48 1.5 Problems 48 1.6 References 51 Dynamic Games of Complete Information 55 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information 57 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction 57 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly 61 2.1.C Wages and Employment