管理者过度自信、薪酬激励与公司价值-金融学专业论文.docxVIP

南京财 南京财经大学硕士学位论文 II II Abstract With the development of behavioral finance, we gradually realize that the assumption of “managers are rationality” has a lot of limitations. Managers often make irrational decisions, and they will affect the companys financial management objectives - maximize the value of the company - to achieve. Recently, some scholars have focused on the researches of managerial overconfidence as well as its effects on the companys MA, investment and financing decisions. However, research of the relation between the managerial overconfidence and firm value is almost blank. As an important part of the theory of behavioral corporate finance, managerial overconfidence theory has broken the traditional study of rational assumptions, and pays more attention to the irrational behavior of managers in decision making, and promotes the researches of the corporate finance theory development in a more realistic direction. With the rapid development of the market economy, the competitiveness of enterprises is essentially the talent competition, and the outstanding senior manager is one of the scarcest human resources. As an important human resource, managers pay has been taken extensive attention by scholars from various countries in the world, especially in recent years, the rapid rising of managers’ pay prompting even more attention and discussion. Studies have shown that both managerial overconfidence and salary incentive will affect the value of the company. However, what kind of the relationship is exactly exists between the degree of managerial overconfidence and salary incentive in affecting the value of the company. Although some literatures have discussed in theory, there are poor empirical evidences to support. In this paper, we take Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies which listed between 2006 and 2011 as the research sample, verify in empirical test that how do the managerial overconfidence and salary incentive affect the value of the co