信息披露质量和现金流外文翻译-其他专业.docVIP

中文2194字 外 文 翻 译 原文： Disclosure Quality and Cash Flow We study a relatively recent change in voluntary disclosure practices by management, namely the issuance of management cash flow forecasts. While we find some management cash flow forecasts in the early 1980s, the incidence of such disclosures is low until recent years. However, since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in the issuance of management cash flow forecasts and the number of such forecasts has more than tripled from pre-2000 levels. One potential explanation for this trend is Regulation FD, which went into effect in 2000. For example, if managers were disclosing cash flow forecasts privately to analysts prior to Regulation FD, they would have to publicly disclose such forecasts to all parties after Regulation FD or curtail their management cash flow forecasts completely. Regulation FD potentially increases company disclosure of a wide array of financial information, including cash flow information. Consistent with this, we also document an increasing frequency of management earnings forecasts in recent years. Another potential explanation for the recent trend of more management cash flow forecasts is investors and analysts paying more attention to cash flow information than before. Recent corporate scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and others, have heightened investor concern over potential accounting earnings manipulations. Such concerns were recently noted in a Business Week article entitled “Fuzzy Numbers”. Consistent with an increase in the demand for cash flow information by investors, we also find analyst forecasts of cash flow during the 2000-2003 period more than doubled from pre-2000 levels. We study voluntary management cash flow forecasts and test hypotheses on managers’ incentives to issue these forecasts. Prior voluntary disclosure literature offers varying predictions for management’s incentives to provide disclosure as well as the nature of information conveyed in managem