股票期权重新定价正面我赢，反面你输.docVIP

本科毕业论文（设计） 外 文 翻 译 原文： Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose Introduction In most publicly traded companies, stock options are a big part of executive compensation, favored as a way to bind the financial interests of executives with shareholders. Although the exercise price of these options is fixed at the time of grant, some companies reprice stock options when stock price drops below the exercise price. The recent downturn in stock markets has prompted many companies to jump on the repricing bandwagon ( Business Week, December11, 2000). Repricing occurs in two ways: (1) either the exercise price is lowered, or (2) the existing options are cancelled and fresh options with a lower exercise price are issued. Critics oppose repricing because managers stand to gain whether stock price goes up or down. This undermines the incentive effects of stock options by eliminating the financial punishment to executives whose mismanagement perhaps led to stock price decline in the first place. The ultimate irony is that repricing increases managerial compensation when managers ought to be fired for poor performance. Institutional investors view repricing as a symptom of managerial entrenchment caused by ineffective corporate governance and routinely use their voting power to block repricing proposals. They are opposed to repricing because each new share granted to employees dilutes the control and returns of existing stockholders. Board of directors of repricing firms defend the practice by arguing that options far out-of-money are devoid of any motivational power, and repricing can restore managerial incentives. Another explanation, prevalent in Silicon Valley, is that repricing is necessary to retain talented employees who would be otherwise lured by rival firms. These firms grant employees stock options to conserve cash and view repricing as necessary to preserve their most valuable asset – human capital. An implicit assumption is that retaining these executive