海湾地区财政援助和直接投资.docxVIP

Executive Summary Emerging markets and developing economies from Africa to the Middle East to Asia now have some interesting choices in development finance part- ners. Where the money comes from matters. First, sources of development finance through loans or foreign direct investment create institutional conse- quences in the recipient state. Second, the dealmaking of development finance creates political alliances that transcend the development transaction and, in many cases, reinforce patronage networks and personalist politics. Third, the efficacy of project delivery and its long-term viability, whether infrastructure investment in utilities or social infrastructure in health and edu- cation, depends on governance, competition, and the E mutual benefits of rule-based markets. Much energy has focused on China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the debt-trap diplomacy it represents. But there is another set of players on the scene whose growth and influence in this sphere have been largely ignored. Gulf Arab states, partic- ularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have increasingly embraced an aggressive growth, investment, and development model for the broader Middle East and an expanding sphere of influence north to Jordan and Egypt, south to Yemen, and southwest to the vital trade corridor around the Ara- bian Sea toward the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Like the People’s Republic of China, the Gulf states are seeking political influence through economic statecraft. This report and an accompanying interactive dataset and tracker are an effort to understand the breadth and scope of Gulf aid and financial inter- vention into a representative set of countries in the Middle East, Horn of Africa, and West Asia. The Gulf Financial Aid and Direct Investment Tracker includes all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Ara- bia, and Un