stata专题视频课程_配套stata视频课程_配套chang_2009_jcf.ppt

Governance with multiple objectives: Evidence from top executive turnoverin China Chang and Wong (2009) Journal of Corporate Finance, 15 (2009): 230– 244 中山大学 连玉君 arlionn@163.com Introduction Corporate governance: ?? Existing studies on managerial turnover mostly focus on privately-controlled firms Existing studies assume shareholders have the same incentive structure to discipline managers under all circumstances. We provide empirical evidence on the monitoring of managers in state-owned firms We assume shareholders have a time-varying objective function that depends on firm performance, profit- and loss-making firms separately Introduction State-owned firms State shareholders are agents of the government Social , political (employment opportunities) v.s. personal objectives (personal wealth, job security) v.s. Firm performance Different situations lead to different levels of importance attached to the objectives and then different importance of factors (e.g., performance, social and political factors) in determining managerial turnover Pre-turnover performance ? managerial turnover ? post-turnover performance State shareholders attach greater importance to firm performance when facing financial losses than in times of profit; Strong incentives to fire the incumbent managers and to hire and monitor the new managers with the ability to improve that performance when facing financial losses Reasons: Greater government pressure as financial loss is a burden on government budgets (subsidy) and on state-owned banks (low cost loans); Less resources for state shareholders to serve personal objectives  Introduction Hypothesis Loss-making firms: Poor performance ? CEO turnover ? Better performance More significant negative relationship between pre-turnover profitability and CEO turnover Managerial turnover in those firms is more likely to be followed by significant improvements in performance Model: Pre-turnover performance and managerial turnover Logit