08 Nash equilibrium location, segregation and randomization分析和总结分析和总结.docxVIP

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08 Nash equilibrium location, segregation and randomization分析和总结分析和总结.docx

Game Theory: Lecture 8 Transcript Overview: We first complete our discussion of the candidate-voter model showing, in particular, that, in equilibrium, two candidates cannot be too far apart. Then we play and analyze Schellings location game. We discuss how segregation can occur in society even if no one desires it. We also learn that seemingly irrelevant details of a model can matter. We consider randomizations first by a central authority (such as in a bussing policy), and then decentralized randomization by the individuals themselves, mixed strategies. Finally, we look at rock, paper, scissors to see an example of a mixed-strategy equilibrium to a game. October 1, 2007 back Professor Ben Polak: So last time we left things in the middle of a model, which was the candidate-voter model. What was--I dont want to go over the whole model again, but just to reiterate a little bit--what was different about that model from what we saw before--the main thing that was different was that the candidates cannot choose their positions. If you like, every voter is a potential candidate but you know the positions of the voters. Let me just bring out two lessons that we left hanging last time. I want to just put them on the board to make sure theyre in your notes. So the first lesson is--one thing we saw already last time--is there can be lots of different Nash Equilibrium this model. There are multiple possible Nash Equilibrium in this model and more to the point, not all of those equilibria have the candidatescrowded at the center. We saw earlyon in the classic Downs or median-voter model that that model predicted crowding the center. This one doesnt, and well come back to that in a second. And a second thing we saw last time was that entry can--if you enter on the left one affect of entering on the left can be to make the candidate on the right more likely to win. Conversely, if you enter on the right--youre a right-wing voter candidate and you enter, that can make it more like

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