- 51
- 0
- 约3.06千字
- 约 3页
- 2021-10-23 发布于广东
- 举报
【ACCA】P1 考试试题及答案
信任不少考生正在努力复习 ACCA P1 考试,今日 yjbys 小编就给
大家带来 ACCA P1 考试试题 Performance-Related Bonus,期望大家在即
将到来的 6 月考试中加油,努力备考吧!
? 1. Background
? Performance-related elements have caused the most controversy in
recent years with some directors being awarded a bonus even though their
firms have underperformed (and in some cases made substantial losses) or
failed to meet or exceed the sector average.
? A balance between short- and long-term bonus schemes should be
found. The ICGN recommends a minimum bonus period of one year (and
not, for example, quarterly) and that bonuses should be based on a percentage
of basic salary (or subject to a fixed cap).
? A danger of bonus schemes is the directors#39; ability to
manipulate the target results on which bonuses are based (e.g. revenue,
profits). Achieving sales targets, in particular, may result in questionable,
unethical practices by directors and employees.
? 2. Best-Practice Guidelines
? The remuneration committee should consider whether directors are
eligible for:
? bull;Annual bonuses. If so, performance conditions should be
relevant, challenging and designed to enhance shareholder value.
? bull;Benefits under long-term incentive schemes.*
? Upper limits should be set and disclosed. There may be a case for part
payment in shares to be held for a significant period.
? In normal circumstances, shares granted or other forms of deferred
remuneration should not vest, and options should not be exercisable, in fewer
than three years.
? Directors should be encouraged to hold their shares for a further
period after vesting or exercise (subject to the need to finance any purchase
costs and associated tax liabilities).
? Proposals for new long-term incentive schemes should be approved
by shareholders and preferably replace existing schemes. Total potential
rewards should not be excessive.
? Payouts or grants under all incentive schemes should be subject to
challenging performance criteria reflecting the firm#39;s ob
原创力文档

文档评论(0)