测量与盈余管理动机：一个批判的视角【外文翻译】.pdfVIP

外文文献翻译 原文： Measurement and Motivations of Earnings Management: A Critical Perspective III. MOTIVATION FOR EARNINGS MANAGEMENT In the wake of Enron and other similar cases, researchers have become more interested in studying the motivations that drive firms to manage their reported earnings. Managers have different incentives to manipulate reported earnings. They may smooth earnings to signal information about future prospects to outsiders or they may use accounting items that are subject to their discretion opportunistically or efficiently. A broad discussion about all situations that might drive managers to manipulate earnings is presented next. Based on that, a judgement can be deduced as to whether earnings manipulations could increase the quality of earnings. In this paper, the different motivations for managerial accounting choices are grouped into five categories: (1) motivations to smooth earnings, (2) motivations to reduce tax expenses, (3) motivations from contractual perspectives, (4) motivations to reduce political costs, and (5) motivations coming from management changes. Motivations to Smooth Earnings A large number of studies have considered income smoothing as an efficient way to reflect a good picture about the firm’s future income flows to investors. Hepworth (1953), an earlier contributor, explains that managers may smooth earnings to reduce the firm’s earnings fluctuation over time rather than to increase reported income. Following the same argument, Gordon (1964) establishes the income-smoothing hypothesis and considers it as good tool to estimate future income flows through enhancing the usefulness of accounting information. His study is considered to be the first step towards formal income smoothing research which has sought to focus on